Background and current understanding of Iranian Missile Strikes into Israel
On 01 October 24, at 1930hrs local time, Iran launched a two waves of ballistic missiles (BMs) against targets in Israel. The attack consisted of approximately 180 ballistic missiles, reportedly consisting mostly of variants of the Shahab-3 Ballistic Missile[1]. The Shahab-3 variants carry a warhead of 760-1,200 kilograms, and the newest variants (Emad and Ghadr) have accuracies as close as 300m to their intended targets.
Iran also claimed to have launched the newly developed, and more advanced, Fattah-2 and Kheibar Shekan – both reportedly fitted with a MaRV (manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle)[2]. A MaRV is a warhead capable of manoeuvring to avoid missile defences, and therefore is a marked improvement on Iran’s earlier missiles.
However, it is probable that this was not the case, instead declaring it’s use falsely for likely propaganda purposes.
The exclusive use of BMs differed from Iran’s earlier strike in April 2024, which used a mixture of drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles. This change is likely due to Iran’s desire to minimise Israeli response time, as Iranian-made drones and cruise missiles are significantly slower-moving than BMs, and easier to intercept.
The large number of simultaneous BMs was highly likely intended to overwhelm Israeli air defences, allowing for a greater number of missiles to hit their targets successfully. The IDF have not released exact figures regarding their total interceptions of Iranian missiles. However, it is likely that Israel’s multilayered air defence system, combined with the confirmation of the US and UK’s involvement, intercepted a high percentage of the Iranian missiles, demonstrated by the reporting of only a single casualty from the bombardment.
Fig. 1: Map of geo-located confirmed BM strikes within Israel.
Targets of the Iranian strike
Below is a list of known targets/targeted locations at the time of writing:
1) The Nevatim Airbase outside Beersheba (houses F-16s) – which pro-Hezbollah media states was used in the killing of Hassan Nasrallah. Geolocated footage shows missile impacts at/near the base.
2) The Hatzerim Airbase in Negev Desert
3) The Tel Nof Airbase, south of Tel Aviv. Geolocated footage shows missile impacts at/ near the base.
4) IDF Glilot Intelligence Base (houses IDF unit 8200 – IDF signals collection unit), and Mossad headquarters. Base was evacuated before attack. Geolocated footage shows missile impacts at/ near the base.
5) Tel Nof Airbase. Geolocated footage shows missile impacts at a school near the base.
6) Shin Bet Headquarters (Israel’s Internal Security Service). Geolocated footage shows missile impacts at a shopping centre located immediately west of the base.
Israel’s response – some possible Courses of Action (COAs)
The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has not released any information regarding specific retaliatory military action. However, since the cessation of the barrage by Iran and it’s proxies, the IDF continued to conduct air strikes in Beirut, whilst also concurrently conducting raids in Southern Lebanon, something that is likely to continue alongside other response measures.
These may include:
1. Continued ground incursion/raids into Southern Lebanon
It is likely that the IDF have gained momentum in achieving operational goals in the region and are therefore unlikely to discontinue these. Similarly, it is highly likely that the disruption to Hezbollah’s Command and Control (caused by explosive pagers and iCOM radios, and the deaths of Hezbollah leaders; including Ali Karaki, Southern Lebanon ground commander; and the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah) caused a delayed reaction by Hezbollah.
As a result the ability and willingness of low-level Hezbollah commanders to commit their men to a ground operation may be reduced, given the lack of operational leadership. It is also likely that the air strikes on Hezbollah munitions caches have impacted on logistical chains potentially affecting strategic reserves, though this is unlikely to impact short term tactical operations in Southern Lebanon. It should also be considered that Hezbollah are likely to coordinate their further responses with Iran and it is possible that Iran is awaiting the outcome of its missile attack (and the IDF response) before escalating further.
For now the IDF is taking advantage of this by targeting tactical objectives close to its border with ground forces while avoiding being decisively engaged in an attritional battle.
2. Targeted strikes against Hezbollah and Hamas political and military leaders
Israel has continually shown reach and access well outside of its borders. One of the most recent significant examples being the targeting of Ismail Haniyeh, the Political Leader of Hamas on 31 Jul 24, whilst he attended the inauguration of Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran. Reportedly, Haniyeh was accommodated in a military-run guesthouse.
Targeting of political and military leaders are highly likely an on-going task by the IDF and security services. It is unlikely therefore, that assassinations would be communicated as a retaliatory measure, and instead will continue when operational triggers are met.
3. Strikes against Iranian military infrastructure and HVTs such as nuclear sites
Israel is also likely to be capable of targeting Iranian economic, military, and nuclear development sites. Previous reports have indicated that Netanyahu has explicitly told Iran that any strike against Israel will result in strikes against Iranian nuclear and oil facilities. It is likely that targeting against oil facilities will affect Iran economically, whilst military sites would likely be targeted for the development of BMs and other munitions used by Iran and it’s proxies. Observers of the Iranian nuclear programme speculate that a nuclear weapon which could target Israel is still 1-2 years away. A combination of such locations being destroyed would highly likely have a detrimental effect for Iran and it’s proxies’ ability to threaten Israel existentially and militarily. Conversely both target sets are likely to invite further responses from Iran, such as disruption to shipping in the Straits of Hormuz, which could lead to a regional escalation spiral.
Summary
The most likely COA likely involves elements of all three of the above actions. At a press conference immediately after the attacks, Netanyahu stated Iran had made a “big mistake” and would “pay for it”. Daniel Haggari, the IDF spokesman stated, “we have plans, and we will operate at the place and time we decide”. It is highly likely that Israel will retaliate, likely with strikes against Iranian HVTs, such as nuclear, military, or oil facilities.
Concurrently, IDF operations within Gaza and Southern Lebanon will almost certainly continue, as will the targeting of Political and Military leaders. Whilst Israel’s response will be significant, it may also incur further reactions from Iran, who fill face the strategic challenge of calibrating its responses to be an effective deterrent without drawing the USA and its allies directly in to the conflict.
It is unlikely Iran has sufficient BM stockpiles or production capability to maintain a high tempo of BM strikes, particularly due to the high number of launches required to penetrate the Israeli missile defences. It is therefore likely that Iran will increase the number of BMs launched should another attack occur, rather than increase frequency of attacks, in order to overwhelm Israeli air defences and retain the capability for a second major strike.
Conflict Timeline
Fig. 2: 14-day timeline of significant events leading up to the 1 Oct 24 attacks
[1] The Shahab-3 variants carry a warhead of 760-1,200 kilograms, and the newest variants (Emad and Ghadr) have accuracies as close as 300m to their intended targets.
[2] A MaRV is a warhead capable of manoeuvring to avoid missile defences, and therefore is a marked improvement on Iran’s earlier missiles.
