Ukraine’s 90 Day Outlook Without US Support
The Jeddah peace talks on 11 March 2025 resulted in a 30-day ceasefire agreement, brokered with US backing, where the US pledged to communicate to Russia that “reciprocity is key to achieving peace.” The US has resumed military and intelligence support to Ukraine post-talks, delivering critical aid and real-time situational awareness.
However, President Trump has made it clear that the “tap can always be turned off” if Ukrainian leadership is deemed non-compliant with US peace talks.
Given that Vladimir Putin has a track record of exploiting ceasefires to consolidate gains and demand concessions[1], it is no surprise that he is demanding a complete cessation of US and allied military aid to Ukraine.
This aims to restrict Ukraine’s capacity to replenish its arsenal during any pause in fighting, positioning Russia to either force the collapse of the ceasefire or claim Kyiv breached terms and resume hostilities from a more advantageous position.
So if Putin gets what he wants and US military support is not resumed, and intelligence support gets turned off again, what does the future look like for Ukraine?
Background
Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, US support has been Ukraine’s backbone, delivering $66.5 billion in military aid by March 2025, including Patriot air defence systems, high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) rocket launchers, and millions of artillery shells.
Intelligence from the NSA, CyberCom, and US commercial and military satellites has provided real-time situational awareness, enabling Ukraine to counter Russian strikes with precision.
President Zelenskyy recently stated that about 33% of battlefield weapons are produced domestically, more than 30% come from Europe and 40% are supplied by the US, highlighting a growing but still incomplete shift towards self-reliance.
European allies are ramping up assistance
France with its CSO-3 satellite launched 6 March 2025, and $204 million in aid, Norway pledging $7.8 billion for 2025 – but their contributions cannot fully replace US capabilities in the short term, particularly advanced weaponry and intelligence.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s domestic production is accelerating. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal recently claimed that by the end of 2025, Ukraine will be able to meet 100% of its artillery needs with domestic production.
What US Stocks Ukraine Has Left
To get a sense of the following 90 days without US support, we must first assess Ukraine’s current reserves of key US stocks as of 10 March 2025. These estimates are derived from available open-source data and cross-checked for plausibility:
- Air defence. Ukraine has multiple Patriot batteries, Stinger systems, and NASAMS, with an estimated stockpile of several hundred missiles across these systems. Exact numbers are classified, but operational capacity likely includes around 180–240 Patriot missiles, based on typical battery loads and reported deliveries (e.g. 90 missiles sent from Israel in January 2025.
- Artillery (tube and MLRS). Ukraine retains approximately 90 M777 howitzers and 24 HIMARS units, with millions of 155mm shells (estimated 2–3 million total supplied, with likely ~1 million remaining) and thousands of HIMARS rockets of varying types (5,000–8,000 left).
- Tanks and armoured vehicles. Around 20 M1 Abrams tanks (out of 31 supplied) and 300 Bradley Fighting Vehicles reportedly remain operational, reflecting losses to Russian attacks.
Table 1. Estimated US equipment stockpiles, monthly usage rates, and depletion timelines. Assumes March 2024 operational tempo during Russia’s push for Avdiivka.
(Caveat: While Ukraine operates non-US systems like S-300, Buk and SAMP/T, providing additional layered defence, as well as Soviet era and European supplies like Caeser howitzers, this report focuses on US-supplied stocks. Their (generally) superior capability, volume and integration with US intelligence have made them indispensable to Ukraine’s defence, a role non-US alternatives cannot fully assume in the short-term. This is particularly true with sophisticated long-range air-defence systems.)
At current consumption rates, and assuming a further pause in US supply, stocks of US-made weapons could be depleted within 2-3 months, depending on operational intensity. The most critical pinch point is Patriot missiles, which could be exhausted in as little as 60 days during high-tempo operations – and this is something Russia would highly likely seek to exploit through an increased tempo/volume of long range strikes.
Domestic artillery production offers some relief, with projections suggesting a potential rise to 300,000+ rounds per month, but this assumes no disruption from global supply chain issues or Russian targeting.
Table 2. Estimated Ukrainian domestic artillery shell production and key milestones.
The Outlook
The First 30 Days
Military Operations
If US military and intelligence aid is paused again, Ukraine initially relies on its reserves. Air defence systems expend tens to hundreds of missiles monthly (e.g., 75–100 Patriots), maintaining targeted defences against Russian strikes.
Artillery fires 60,000–120,000 shells monthly (2,000–4,000 daily) from its ~1 million stockpile, bolstered by domestic production, while HIMARS launches ~500–1,000 rockets from its 5,000–8,000 reserve (CNN Politics, 10 March 2024) per month.
Tanks and Bradleys lose 5-10 vehicles monthly at current land operational tempo. European aid, like Norway’s $7.8 billion, arrives gradually, slowed by logistics (Euronews, 8 March 2025).
Intelligence Challenges
The loss of intelligence support is the primary set back. Losing NSA signals intelligence (SIGINT) and US satellite coverage (approximately 50 commercial and 15 military satellites) severely limits Ukraine’s situational awareness and ability to anticipate Russian strikes, especially in Kursk, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk. Although the European contributions do not match the high-frequency coverage of US satellites, they offer regular high resolution imagery:
- France. The CSO-1, 2 and 3 satellites, deliver 20-30cm resolution imagery via Safran. AI’s Robin platform in Kyiv.
- Finland. As of March 2025, Ukraine reportedly owns two Finnish ICEYE synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites and has access to 44 others, with resolutions from 25-100cm. The SAR systems are weather and cloud agnostic making them a critical addition to Ukrainian capabilities.
- Sentinel (European Space Agency). Sentinel-1 (SAR) and Sentinel-2 (optical) provide free data at 5-20m resolutions. However, their lower detail makes it near impossible to positively identify military equipment, therefore limiting their utility for precise military targeting compared to CSO and ICEYE.
Image 1. Tu-95 at Engels-2 Airbase, Saratov Oblast, Russia. Comparison showing the difference in resolution between 30cm resolution satellite imagery (left) and 5m resolution Sentinel satellite imagery (right).
1-3 Months
Air Defence
By June 2025, air defence reserves are largely depleted. With 75–100 Patriot missiles used monthly, the ~180–240 stockpile could vanish after two months. Ukrainian airspace risks becoming permissive to Russian fast air as Ukraine is forced to triage:
- Tripwire strategy. Ukraine retains a minimal Patriot missile reserve as a ‘Tripwire Strategy’ – a thin line of deterrence to keep Russian pilots from crossing into the airspace of major urban centres. This means focusing on aircraft, permitting Shaheds and other munitions through. Russian Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft intensify aerial probes to gauge Patriot stocks.
- Russian suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) surge. RFAF doubles SEAD missions from 10–15 daily in 2024 to 20–30 by June, exploiting Patriot gaps. Su-34s and Su-35s push 50–100 km closer, lifting sorties 25–35% (50–70 daily) – a return to 2022 intensity.
- Glide bomb escalation. Effective SEAD operations enable FAB-500 to FAB-1500 glide bombs (40–60 km range) to jump from 50–60 daily to 90–120 daily. Kharkiv and Sumy, within range, endure sustained attacks. Russia’s SEAD, sorties, and glide bombs reshape air combat. SEAD neuters Ukraine’s defences, sorties reclaim airspace, and glide bombs – cheap and abundant – consistently target cities.
Once Russian air superiority is established over operational areas, the tempo of strikes on military and infrastructure targets accelerates, driving territorial gains more than any other factor.
Projected Territorial Gains
During the 2022 invasion, Russia averaged 8-12km/week in successful offensives (20-25km/day in open terrain, 0.5-1.5km/day in urban). Bakhmut, which was heavily defended was 33-66m a day and Avdiivka 83-116m/day with US aid.
A lack of Patriot missiles, HIMARS precision, and US intelligence will increase Russian rates of advance (tempered of course, by Ukrainian domestic production, European aid and spring/autumn mud (Rasputitsa).
There is a realistic possibility Russia will maintain its momentum following recent gains in the Kursk Oblast (March 2025), opening up a new front on Sumy oblast, further stretching Ukrainian manpower and resources.
In Kharkiv Oblast, given Russian success in reaching the parts of the Oskil river, it is possible UAF might opt for a full withdrawal west of the river, giving up a significant portion of reclaimed territory to consolidate their defences.
Table 3. Projections suggest total gains anywhere from 117-207km, potentially doubling 2024’s annual pace, driven by air and artillery dominance but checked by Ukrainian adaptation, domestic production, and Europe’s support.
Graphic 1. Russia’s projected territorial gains after 90 days without US support – a balance between realistic and worst-case scenarios.
HIMARS, Artillery, and Long-Range Pressure
- HIMARS. At 500–1,000 rockets monthly, the 5,000–8,000 stockpile declines to 3,500–6,500 by June, reducing precision strikes.
- Artillery. The ~1 million shells decrease to 700,000–880,000 by June 2025 (60,000–120,000 monthly), supplemented by domestic production but still overshadowed by Russia’s 100,000+ monthly usage; Russia’s artillery production is estimated at roughly 177,000 rounds per month and projected to reach up to 300,000 round per month by late 2025.
- Long-range threats. Russia’s continued 2025 Shahed surge (average of 128 daily since December 2024 and rising) drains defences, paving the way for cruise and ballistic missiles. Intercepts fall from 79.8% to below 40% (pre-US support interception rates). Early signs of this trend emerged around 3 March 2025 after the military aid and US intelligence cut off, resulting in a noticeable drop in successful interception rates.
Image 2. Numbers of Shahed OWA-UAS increased significantly in the last two months, with an almost 50% increase in February.
Impact of Lost US Intelligence and Indirect Fire Systems
The loss of US intelligence and Ukrainian artillery and MLRS shortages lead to a cascade of operational challenges:
- Russian grouping size. Historically, Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) have faced heavy losses, forcing a shift to larger formations such as brigade or even regimental/division-sized groupings. With reduced intelligence, and less Ukrainian counter-battery fire and diminished MLRS, Russia can deploy larger combined arms formations with greater freedom of manoeuvre. The reduction in ISR and indirect fires would allow greater forces to mass – leading to offensive activity based around brigades and divisions, rather than company or battalion-level elements. These will become the dominant force along the FLOT, increasing pressure on Ukrainian positions. Russian logistics, historically weak, may improve with reduced Ukrainian deep-strike fires, which could also allow them to better integrate North Korean units.
- Operational implications. Larger Russian groupings facilitate more effective combined arms operations, particularly in offensive scenarios. Without sufficient intelligence to direct remaining HIMARS or tube artillery, command nodes and logistics hubs face less disruption. Sophisticated Russian radar, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and air defences deploy nearer the FLOT with reduced vulnerability.
- Tactical adjustments. Ukrainian units, unable to rely on high artillery volumes to suppress advances, will shift to asymmetric tactics, European-enabled precision strikes (Storm Shadows) on high value targets, increased mines and fortifications, and deeper-echeloned defensive lines are likely to become more critical.
Broader Implications
The sustained pressure affects UAF morale and recruitment as urban strikes and territorial losses mount. Despite long-term plans for European fund raising, Ukraine’s $179 billion GDP becomes strained without US assistance. Reconstruction funds ($486 billion) are redirected to defence (up to 10%).
Increases in glide bomb strikes against major urban centres raise the total number of internally displaced Ukrainians.
Calls for President Zelenskyy to negotiate intensify, while pro-Russian elements exploit the opportunity to push for concessions.
Conclusion
The Jeddah peace talks provide a positive outlook, but if US military and intelligence “tap” is turned off again and remains off, Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian aggression is greatly reduced within 60-90 days.
Air defences are exhausted, Russian air superiority drives rapid territorial gains and the loss of US intelligence enables Russian operational advantages. In the medium-term, Europe can likely compensate for the deficit of everything but the most sophisticated US weapons, and Ukraine’s domestic artillery and drone production offers hope for self-reliance. However, a dangerous gap may emerge as manufacturing ramps up. The deficit is more insurmountable (and important) when it comes to intelligence sharing where European nations are significantly behind US capabilities.
As it stands, the biggest risk is that Putin leverages the ceasefire proposals to secure additional concessions, like keeping US military aid suspended indefinitely. As assessed, this will restrict Ukraine’s ability to rearm before hostilities inevitably resume and it is unlikely that Putin will co-operate with a ceasefire while on the brink of evicting Ukrainian forces from the Kursk salient.
References
[1] Eastern Ghouta (2018): In 2018, President Putin ordered daily five-hour “humanitarian pauses” in Eastern Ghouta, Syria, diverging from a UN-mandated 30-day ceasefire. Critics viewed this move as a tactic to manage international perception while pursuing military objectives.
