North (assessed Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) Main Effort).

  • West of the Dnieper there have been no significant RFAF gains, with the Forward Line of Enemy Troops (FLET) now in the vicinity of (IVO) Bucha.
  • To the north-west, in the Poliskyi Oblast, near the Belarussian border and west of Pripyat, Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) claimed counterattacks that forced withdrawal by RFAF units. These are likely intended to frustrate RFAF reinforcement and resupply as well as pose a security dilemma in rear areas to force the dilution of combat power from the front.
  • East of the Dnieper, Russian forces launched another assault onto northern Chernihiv but were reportedly repelled. UAF Volunteer Defence Units continue to ambush and harass RFAF logistics convoys IVO Chernihiv.


  • Sumy remains surrounded on three sides however, bombardment has become sporadic over the last 24hrs and it is reported that a humanitarian evacuation took place on 10 Mar 22.
  • On the axis from the east towards Kyiv, RFAF reportedly launched an attack into Skybyn but were repelled and retreated towards Bohdanivka on the M01/E95 Highway. RFAF are likely resetting in Bohdanivka, approximately 5km from Skybyn and 15km from Brovary in north-east Kyiv.
  • RFAF reportedly launched a Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) strike on Nizhyn on the P67 road NE of Kyiv.
  • To the SE of Kharkiv, RFAF have reportedly seized Mala Rohan, highly likely intended to sever the Ground Line of Communication (GLoC) between Kharkiv and Chuhuiv and further isolate Kharkiv.


  • Ukrainian Anti-Terror Operation (ATO) forces continue to hold their defensive positions to the west of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk with no territorial changes of note.
  • In Luhansk Oblast, offensives continue in the area of Rubizhne, Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk, however UAF defences are reportedly holding.
  • Once Izium is either isolated or cleared, it is likely that RFAF will seek to cut off UAF units defending Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. It is reported that over 1000 civilians evacuated Izium in the last 24hrs, despite occasional bombardment from RFAF.
  • In Donetsk province, and to the southwest along the coast of the Sea of Azov, forces from the eastern axis have made no progress of note.


  • On the southern axis, there has been little progress IVO Mariupol and the siege continues. RFAF forces surrounding the city did not recognise or adhere to the Ukrainian humanitarian ceasefire – with Russia-proposed humanitarian corridors leading only into Russia also being ignored by the Ukrainians. It is a realistic possibility that another concerted effort to break into Mariupol from both the eastern and western axes will occur over 12-13 Mar 22.
  • On the west bank of the Dnieper River, RFAF have made some small progress, taking Mylove and Dudchany as they progress north along the T0403, with a likely objective of Nikopol.
  • A second narrow front has emerged from this axis proceeding north and having taken Bila Krynitsia they are advancing towards Kryvyi Rih, a town where two major MSRs intersect (H11 and H23).
  • In the western aspect of the southern axis, the siege of eastern Mykolaiv ins ongoing, with no attempt yet to seize the city. Ukrainian volunteers are reportedly constructing defensive earthworks to the east of the town in anticipation of an RFAF assault in the near future, possibly within the next 96hrs.
  • There is no reporting to indicate RFAF progress north into Voznesensk on the P06 road. Given the current rate of RFAF advance, Odessa is unlikely to come under siege from ground elements within the next two weeks. This is with the exception of an amphibious assault. Any amphibious assault into a contested area would need to be preceded by significant preparatory fires, which would be a major indicator if intent and timelines.


Further ceasefires on 10 Mar 22 were of mixed success. More corridors have reportedly been proposed and opened by the UAF:

  • Mariupol-Zaporizhzhia (unlikely to be successful)
  • Volnovakha-Pokrovsk
  • Polohy-Zaporizhzhia
  • Enerhodar-Zaporizhzhia
  • Izium-Lozova
  • British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has publicly warned Russia about the potential use of Chemical Weapons (CW) in Ukraine. UK and US sources report that Russian Information Operations (IO) regarding US bioweapons and CW labs in Ukraine may be considered as shaping activity for a possible ‘false flag’ operation to frame UAF for the supposed use of CW, subsequently escalating the military and humanitarian situation in Ukraine and raising the strategic stakes.
  • China’s Premier Li Keqiang has called the situation in Ukraine “grave” and offered Beijing’s help in playing a “positive role” for peace while continuing to refuse to criticize Russia. Concurrently, China has reportedly sent approximately $800,000 of humanitarian aid to Ukraine whilst condemning sanctions against Russia. China is highly likely to continue to try to balance their alliance and economic ties to Russia whilst placating the west and wanting to be seen as an important international interlocutor.
  • President Putin reportedly announced at a National Security Council meeting today that “foreign mercenaries fighting for Ukraine is a violation of international law” and then mentioned the possibility of enabling (up to 16,000) Syrian volunteers to travel to Ukraine.

So What?

No significant territorial changes are indicative of consolidation and amassing of supplies prior to renewed offensives against major urban centres, whilst attacks through more rural areas seek to isolate UAF elements which have been fixed in contact with the RFAF.

Despite some limited tactical success, the Russian operation is likely proceeding broadly in line with Russian intent. Operationally Russia continues to consolidate ground and is highly likely striving to deconflict logistic movements to enable a renewed offensive against Kyiv and other besieged cities. Kyiv almost certainly remains the RFAF Main Effort

It is unlikely that any significant humanitarian relief will occur in the short term. Evacuations of civilians from frontline areas like Bucha reduces opportunities for deception and covert assistance to UAF in Kyiv as well as increasing the burden on facilities, stores, and utilities.

The increased rhetoric regarding strategic issues is of concern, with the possible use of CW almost certain to be a NATO ‘red line’ it could significantly escalate the conflict outside of Ukraine.

It is currently assessed as unlikely that Russia will enable the deployment of pro-Russian Syrian forces in Ukraine in the short term, as co-ordination and integration into the RFAF in a conventional conflict is likely to prove challenging. It is a realistic possibility that as the conflict endures, Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs) will be used to train and operate alongside foreign fighters.

What Next?

It is a realistic possibility that there will be significant offensive activity over the next 96hrs against Kyiv and Sumy – as long as RFAF logistics convoys complete their resupply and additional combat units arrive at the front. There is currently no indication that Odessa is a target in this phase of the operation, and it is a realistic possibility that this will remain the case until Kyiv is seized. Diplomatic efforts are likely to continue with no success, and sanctions against Russia and Russians will begin to have a more significant effect within Russia. It is unlikely however that economic sanctions will lead to any regime change in Russia in the short to medium term, and it should not be forgotten that maintaining power and position is almost invariably the primary aim of an autocratic ruler.