This article examines the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in enabling Russian government narratives with regards to the conflict in Ukraine and some of the corresponding politics being played out within the Christian Orthodox faith.
In the latter days of the Soviet Union, President Mikhail Gorbachev was forced to face the reality of the failings of his long-awaited perestroika, as the Soviet Union continued to plunge deeper into economic distress. On his search for alternative ways to create a sense of social cohesion, Gorbachev staged a meeting with the heads of the Russian Orthodox church (ROC) in 1988.
This was the first time a Soviet leader engaged with the Christian church since the days of Stalin, therefore marking the beginning of the shift away from the state-sanctioned atheism of the Soviet Union. Soon, the ROC was granted various tax successions and increased land allocations, and Orthodox Christianity swiftly became the new state-allied religion.
With the looming dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ROC attempted to curb rising Russian anxieties as neighbouring states, which had previously belonged to the Kremlin, announced their independence. The ROC began constructing a new spiritual framework for Russia, one that stated that all former territories of Rus are destined to return in order to form a grand empire, like Rome or Constantinople. This allowed the Orthodox ecclesiastical institution to portray Russia as a supreme moral and political authority, and the return of ex-Soviet states fulfilled ancient prophecies concerning the restoration of the Holy Rus.
The ROC has seen difficulties in maintaining its foothold in Ukraine, as desires for national independence have risen since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and spiked sharply after Viktor Yanukovich’s Kremlin-backed stint in office. However, the ROC is still firmly rooted within the Ukrainian religious landscape in the form of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, or the UOC(MP). Headed by Metropolitan Onufriy (‘Metropolitan’ being an ecclesiastical title in Ukraine) and based in Pechersk Lavra (central Kyiv). The UOC(MP) was created in 1992 in retaliation to the formation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the UOC(KP), and had attempted to shape itself as a separate entity from the ROC, despite its clergy clearly subscribing to Russian institutional ideals.
The UOC(MP) stated that it was a Ukrainian, and not Russian organisation. However, the UOC(KP) was framed as a true revivalist entity, designed to symbolise Ukrainian emancipation from the control of both the ROC and the UOC(MP). Although the UOC(KP) functioned as an independent body since the 1990s, it was only granted autocephaly (legitimacy) by Constantinople in 2018, by request of Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko. Constantinople serves as the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the ‘primus inter pares’ (‘first among equals’, an essential head of Patriarchs), and essentially functions as the ‘mother church’ of most other Orthodox Patriarchates. Poroshenko sought to distance Ukrainian institutions from Russian influence following Yanukovych’s presidency and the subsequent Euromaidan protests, as the UOC(KP) became involved in campaigning and sheltering protestors. In this way they built themselves a freshly patriotic identity separate from the UOC(MP), which refused to comment on Russian police brutality and the need for an independent Ukraine. “Shortly after Constantinople granted independence to the UOC(KP), Metropolitan Hilarion stated that Constantinople’s actions went “against historical truths” [1] concerning the unity of the Holy Rus.
Figure 1. Euromaidan Protestors sleeping in the safety of Mikhailovsky Monastery, Kyiv. Found here
It is not difficult to see this rhetoric manifest itself in the speeches given by Vladimir Putin, as the ROC and the Kremlin have carefully cultivated a basis for the repossession and ‘re-Russification’ of ex-Soviet territories since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This point of view is often championed by Patriarch Kirill, who imbues his sermons with ideas of ‘uniting the holy Rus,’ and ‘strengthening the fatherland.’[2] Kirill has been head of the ROC since 2009 and has maintained close ties to the Kremlin throughout his ecclesiastical career. Notably, Swiss police have recently reported that Kirill had engaged in espionage activities while he served as a priest in Moscow, and acted as a KGB agent when representing the Moscow Patriarchate in the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Geneva in the 1980s.[3]
Figure 2 : Patriarch Kirill awarded the Order of St Andrew the Apostle the First-Called by Vladimir Putin in Nov 2021, the highest state award of the Russian Federation. Found here
In Russia, damaging ideologies filter top-down. Narratives stating that Putin’s reign is a ‘miracle of God’ trickle from Kirill’s pulpit into local communities [4], and the belief that dying while fighting in Ukraine ‘washes away all sins’ is frequently used in attempts to recruitment military personnel [5]. Narratives created by pro-Kremlin institutions are parroted back by state-controlled media, and overwhelm the limited information space available to the average Russian citizen.
There are numerous debates concerning the extent of religiosity in Russia. The poll below was undertaken by the Levada Centre, which is a Russian nongovernmental research organisation. This survey highlights the rise of Orthodox Christians in Russia, which has grown from 69% to 79% in the last 10 years. This increase is likely due to the religiosity of generations that did not live beneath the imposed atheism of the Soviet state. This raises questions about whether supporting the narratives of the ROC requires adherence to Orthodox Christianity, as 21% of respondents have branded themselves as ‘totally non-religious.’
Figure 3. Levada Centre Survey of ‘Religious Beliefs,’ published in June 2023. This survey shows the number of respondents describing themselves as very or somewhat religious has grown by 10% from 2014 to 2023.
The Levada Centre also undertook a study into the public opinion concerning the interaction between church and state. More than half of the participants (62%) claim that the ROC either has ‘just enough’ involvement with state policy (44%) or believe that the ROC should be more involved with stately matters (18%). However, the number of participants that have stated that the ROC has too much involvement with the state has risen by 12% since 2016. Although it is nearly impossible to state that the influence of the ROC is subsiding, it does raise a series of questions concerning the future of faith in Russia, and whether the Kremlin and ROC will ever be forced to function as independent entities as a result of civic pressures.
Figure 4: Levada Centre Survey of ‘Church and State,’ published in January 2022.
There is no doubt that the imperial goals shared by the ROC and Kremlin seek to reconstruct the Ukrainian nation within a Russian mould, as both have passionately supported the Russian invasion and likened it to an act of restoring the great Holy Rus. The manner in which Patriarch Kirill compared the death of Russian soldiers to the sacrificial death of Jesus [6] compliments the Kremlin’s promise of millions of roubles of compensation for soldiers that suffered injuries on the battlefield. The two institutions work together to highlight that all manners of sacrifice will be rewarded, spiritually and physically. It is clear that the ROC not only serves the spiritual needs of Russian troops, but also amplifies state-backed, internal narratives regarding the conflict in Ukraine. This suggests that the Kremlin no longer shies away from acknowledging the ROC as an organic part of its corporate identity, as chaplains are now embedded in battle-field units in the same way political commissars were during previous conflicts [7].
Figure 5: Russian army’s soldiers perform on Orthodox Christmas eve in a church near the village of Arsaki, northeast of Moscow. Found here
So What?
The Russian identity is rooted in nationalism and spiritual self-assurance, as the discourses perpetrated by Russian institutions instil ideas of ethic and spiritual superiority. The role of the ROC in the war in Ukraine cannot be underestimated, and its actions have explicitly projected support for Russian expansion; from viral images of priests blessing a weapon system during Russia’s victory parade in 2015, to Patriarch Kirill likening Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the reunification of the Holy Rus. In both Russia and Ukraine, churches function as battlegrounds for political discourse.
Prior to 2018, Ukrainian and Russian nationalist ideas were not fighting on equal ground, as Ukraine’s religious and political infrastructures were tied to the ROC. However, the rejection of the Russian regime by ordinary Ukrainians, as well as Ukrainian governmental authorities, caused a shift in discourse surrounding identity and ideology. It is reported that approximately 600,000 Ukrainians left parishes belonging to the UOC(MP), and over 85% of Ukrainian voters supported government bills to restrict the influence of the UOC(MP) [8]. By de-Russifying the religious bedrock that post-Soviet nations are built upon, Ukraine is able to define its identity in accordance with more Western-leaning constructions of religion and politics as two separate entities.
Figure 6: A viral picture that circulated main-stream media, said to be taken in 2022. However, this image is from 2015, and was taken from a ritual of blessing the participants of the Victory Parade and the consecration of launchers on the Khodynka field. Found at Blessing Bombs, Putin’s Altar Boy, and Twisting Russian Orthodoxy to Sanctify Nuclear War | Outrider
Responsibility for the Russian propaganda machine is often attributed solely to the Kremlin, with the ROC seen as merely a ‘supporting act’. However, recognising the ROC as more than an arm of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine is vital. The ROC is the instrument which allowed the Kremlin to reconnect with the general populace after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and thanks to this process it emerges as the most influential force in the civic sector. This symbiotic couple continues to flood the Russian information space with ideas of Russian imperialism and moral authority, and portrays Ukraine as a nation of separatists who must be forced beneath the yoke of the true political and spiritual authorities.
What Next?
Ukraine is currently in a period of national redefinition as it simultaneously attempts to reclaim portions of its identity, and also create new boundaries of belief. Therefore, the fact that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has been granted legitimacy by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople does not signify the end of the Ukrainian search for independence, but actually marks the beginning of a long and difficult period of self-understanding. Every renewed wave of Russian assaults further reinforces the necessity of maintaining and formulating a firm and definite Ukrainian political and religious identity, as far from Russian influence as possible. The effect that Russian institutional propaganda has on the Russian military and population is not likely to change, as the Kremlin and ROC have successfully ‘weaponised’ ideas of patriotism and personal sacrifice to service both secular and religious causes. The ROC is instrumental within internal Russian Information Operations and maintaining Russian public support to the war – which aids in recruitment and also mitigates the potential societal impact. The ROC is a state-backed organisation that continues to tow the Kremlin’s line regarding ‘traditional family values’ in opposition to the West and Ukraine’s ‘corrupt moral compass’, and their support to the Kremlin highly likely reduces the potential for civil unrest due to secondary effects from the war, including but not limited to; fighting age males fleeing the country, increases in the price of commodities, a transition to a ‘war time’ economy, increased defence spending, mobilisation, and significant losses in personnel.
The future of the UOC(MP) in Ukraine does not look particularly bright. According to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, in April 2024, 83% of Ukrainians believed that the state should intervene with the activities of the UOC(MP) [9]. Following on from the eviction notices issued by the Ukrainian government in March 2023, it is highly likely that the UOC(MP) will totally lose their stronghold in Pechersk Lavra in the near future. Although Metropolitan Onufriy did announce the UOC(MP)’s separation from the ROC, it is clear that no such split has actually taken place, as internal links to Russia persist. The recent discovery that Metropolitan Onufriy and many of his clergy had once possessed Russian citizenship only furthers the suspicion of their continued allegiance with Moscow. It is likely that the UOC(MP)’s biggest fear is being deemed illegitimate by both the ROC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, much like the UOC(KP) was until 2018, and hence they are hesitant in proclaiming their strict independence from Moscow in fear of embroiling themselves within another schism , and making a powerful enemy.
On 20 August 2024, the Ukrainian government approved a bill to ban all activities of the UOC(MP) in Ukraine, on the grounds of national security. Now signed into law by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the bill states that each Orthodox parish has nine months to decide whether to pledge allegiance to the UOC(KP) or be expelled from the Ukrainian religious sphere. This is a significant step in the UOC(KP)’s quest to eliminate pro-Russian rhetoric within Ukrainian religious institutions, and it is highly unlikely that the UOC(MP) will gain any more power or influence in Ukraine in the near future. Even in the unlikely event that Metropolitan Onufriy and his affiliates actually reject the ROC, they will continue to be viewed as Russian agents by the Kyiv Patriarchate and its followers. Consequently, in the coming years the UOC(MP) is highly likely to wither and die and be totally replaced by the UOC(KP), if Ukrainian efforts in the war prevail. However, if Russia manages to turn the tide, there is no doubt that the ROC will try to re-exert its authority over the Ukrainian church and use it to advance narratives which undermine a separate Ukrainian identity in occupied areas.
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Sources
- Russian Orthodox Church severs links with Constantinople – BBC News
- The Illusion of Unity: Patriarch Kirill’s Ideological Ultimatum to the Church (publicorthodoxy.org).
- (1) The Mikhailov Files: Patriarch Kirill and the KGB | Felix Corley – Academia.edu
- The Russian Orthodox Leader at the Core of Putin’s Ambitions – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
- Orthodox Church leader says Russian soldiers dying in Ukraine will be cleansed of sin | Reuters
- Smith, P., ‘Moscow Patriarch: Russian War Dead Have Their Sins Forgiven’ in AP NEWS, September 27 2022, Moscow patriarch: Russian war dead have their sins forgiven | AP News.
- https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/9/far-from-harmless-patriarch-kirill-backs-putins-war-but-at-what-cost
- Analysis: Poll Shows Ukrainians See UOC’s Anti-Ukraine Activity as Widespread (kyivpost.com)
- Ukraine’s president signs law banning Russia-linked religious groups | CNN
Other sources
Mankoff, J., ‘The Orthodox Schism’, in CSIS, 19 October 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/orthodox-schism-shadow-empire.
Bociurkiw, B.R., ‘Ukrainization Movements within the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church’ in Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 3/4, 1979-1980, pp. 92-111.
Petro, N. N., ‘The Gospel According to Poroshenko: Politics, Religion, and the New Church of Ukraine’ in Yale Journal of International Affairs, 14, 2019, pp.84-100.
Seddon, M., ‘War costs Russia its Influence with Ukraine’s Orthodox Believer,’ in Financial Times, 3 July 2022, War costs Russia its influence with Ukraine’s Orthodox believers (ft.com)
(1) The Mikhailov Files: Patriarch Kirill and the KGB | Felix Corley – Academia.edu
