Executive Summary

• The overall threat within Kyiv is assessed as
• In the last 30-days, one series of strikes was reported on 26 June 2022. These strikes targeted the central districts in Kyiv city, including a kindergarten. No further strikes have been reported in Kyiv or its immediate environs.
• Analysis of Russian strike activity over the last 60-days highlights that there have been no incidents reported on consecutive days.
• Despite this threat, ground atmospherics show that the local population continue with their normal day-to-day activities across the city. High-profile visits from western leaders and VIPs in other sectors and industries have been observed and will continue in the medium term.
• The threat to travel from Poland to Kyiv is still assessed to be
• The threat to Ukrainian rail infrastructure remains
• The threat from criminality is also assessed to be
• The risk of a Road Traffic Accident (RTA) is judged to be

Kyiv – Status and Atmospherics

No change since the last report. The centre of Kyiv remains under Ukrainian control following the RFAF withdrawal in late March 2022. Bars and restaurants remain open in the city. Prevail staff based in Kyiv have reported that the wealthier members of Kyiv society are out in the city in numbers, seeking to regain a sense of normalcy. The residents of Kyiv are doing their best to move on from the war, and restaurants, bars and clubs are frequented outside the hours of curfew.

Ukrainian officials have continued to host VIP visits throughout the last 30-days, including several key European leaders, and high-profile actor, Ben Stiller. The Netherlands Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, has been in Kyiv within the last 72-hours.

Threat Update – RFAF Bombardment Activity

RFAF have continued to conduct strike activities against the city; however, these are irregular and appear indiscriminate. Missile fires from within Belarus (or Belarusian airspace) are likely to have a short flight time to Kyiv if that is the target.

Since 01 June 2022, the following Kyiv districts have been targeted:

• On 04 June 2022, RFAF targeted railway infrastructure objects in Darnitsa and Dniprovsky districts; Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) shot down one other missile near Obukhiv district.
• On 19 June 2022, UAF air defences engaged a possible missile near Vyshorod district, causing an explosion.
• On 26 June 2022, RFAF missile strikes hit residential buildings in Shevchenkyvsky district; an impact was also reported near a local kindergarten. These strikes were likely in response to the G7 summit in Bavaria, Germany, to demonstrate to the international community that Russia could still reach into Kyiv city.

High-profile international summits, UAF attacks on Russian territory, and any perceived NATO transgressions are likely to be causal factors for sporadic RFAF missile strikes into Kyiv until conflict end

Threat Update – Landmine / Anti-personnel Mines / Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO)

No landmine, anti-personnel, or UXO activity has been reported in the last 30-days.

Threat Update – Other Notable Events

No other notable activity – including Russian saboteur threats – has been reported in the last 30-days.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)

No current indicators in reporting to suggest that Russia intends to deploy CBRN weapons against Kyiv, nor is there any current Toxic Industrial Chemical hazard reported.

Kyiv - Threat Assessment

The overall threat within Kyiv continues to be assessed as

• To coincide with high-profile international summits (as evidenced on 26 June 2022)
• If Russia feels that it is being antagonised by NATO
• Russian territorial sovereignty is compromised (i.e. Russia claims it has been attacked by Ukraine or NATO).

In such scenarios, it is likely that strikes would occur in the following 24-hours of these situations. There is also no recent evidence to suggest that Russia would carry out consecutive strikes against Kyiv. Recent strike activity has been more symbolic in nature, as opposed to contributing towards a strategic, or operational objective. This is particularly evident following increased Russian use of older or non-specialised land attack missiles in strikes, which have greater inaccuracy and therefore a greater chance of causing collateral damage.

It remains advised that if Russia communicates its intent to strike Kyiv, all parties should avoid industrial and military-linked locations for a period of up to 96-hours.

The threat from small arms fire in Kyiv continues to be assessed as

Route Overview

Roads into Kyiv

As at 12 July 2022, all routes running from the Polish border to Kyiv, are unrestricted. Information from ground teams show there to be no issues with all Check Points (CPs) from the West entering Kyiv on the E40, or from the South on the E95/M05. There are queues as per normal in the morning and evening for commuter traffic. Expect passport checks at CPs.

Slightly longer queues at the CPs entering Kyiv from the Southeast on the M03, with a noticeable increase in security checks and queuing when entering Kyiv from the East (along the M01 from Brovary).

The only restricted area for vehicles is in the vicinity of the Office of the President Ukraine.

Rail and Metro

The rail network has been hampered by infrastructural damage caused by the ongoing conflict. However, national rail services continue, with trains to central and western Ukraine operating each day. European leaders typically use the overnight train from Poland, transiting to Kyiv. Social media reporting also suggests more train services are being implemented in other areas of Ukraine, including to Dnipro and Zaporizhya.

Reporting shows that Kyiv’s underground Metro, taxis, and public transport are running as normal - and most shops are open for business.

Curfews

A curfew across Kyiv city is in place from 2300hrs – 0500hrs (local). No additional curfews are in place.

Polish Border Crossing Points (BXPs)

As at 12 July 2022, all Polish-Ukrainian BXPs are open and functional for foot passengers, cars, and trucks.

According to open-source information, the busiest crossings are at Hrebenn, Korczowa and Medyka – for cargo vehicles. Official border crossing wait times can be found at the Polish Government run website

There are no reports of criminal activity taking place at the BXPs; however, the threat from low-level criminals is likely to persist throughout the conflict (e.g. theft).

Prevail staff crossed the Medyka BXP on foot on 12 July 22 and stated there were no issues with either paperwork or carriage of medical and tactical equipment. Neither COVID-19 paperwork, nor proof of residence/work were required, and the interaction was professional and painless.

RFAF Strike Locations

No change to Russian target selection since the last report.

Most RFAF strikes have targeted infrastructure and military targets. Logistics hubs, railway stations, other civilian infrastructure, and military targets have been struck previously.

Avoid stopping near or passing concentrations of Ukrainian military equipment and personnel, government and communications infrastructure, and major rail hubs to reduce the risk of becoming collateral damage from Russian long-range and aircraft strikes.

There are no reported incidents of strikes against Main Supply Routes (MSRs), highways or ‘B-roads’.

Route – Threat Assessment

The overall threat to travel from Poland to Kyiv, Ukraine is still assessed as

There

• The threat from RFAF strikes is assessed as
• The threat from criminality is assessed as
• The threat of an RTA caused by volume of traffic/returnees is assessed as

It is likely that any CPs encountered will be professionally run by either regular UAF, Ukrainian Police, or Territorial Defence Units. These CPs will be passable with the correct paperwork. It is likely that the personnel manning the CPs will be vigilant and looking out for Russian sympathisers, agents, and saboteurs; particularly on MSRs near major conurbations. Reporting from Prevail and local sources in Kyiv have stated that there has been a change in the manning of CPs in Kyiv city itself – with regular UAF personnel being replaced with National Guard members. There has been no apparent decrease in professionalism associated with the change. Extortion at CPs is considerably more common in the poorer eastern areas of Ukraine but has not been prevalent in urban centres – particularly in Kyiv.

1